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encourages interventions, the primary disputing states may prefer ad hoc
arbitration, where intervention is not possible. By summarily refusing in-
terventions without granting a hearing, as it did in this case, justice is not
seen to be done.
35
CONCLUSION
The above comments look forward-to the issues that the case raises for
the shaping of an international legal order for the future. I have intentionally
not dealt with the underlying jurisdictional issues of the case, the factual
controversies or the application of the law to the facts of the particular
situation, but that silence should not be taken as agreement. The more
general issues should attract scholarly discussion. They are not new. The
creation of new international legal norms is a matter of general and con-
tinuing interest that transcends the boundaries of particular subfields of
international law. The standards for the legitimate use of force have engaged
that discussion since the inception of the debate over the definition of
aggression and will continue to do so. For those concerned with the future
role of the Court, the more procedural issues will also be of interest.
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THE OTHER SHOE FALLS: THE FUTURE OF ARTICLE 36(1)
JURISDICTION IN THE LIGHT OF NICARAGUA
In the wake of the 1984 Judgment of the International Court on juris-
diction and admissibility issues in the Nicaragua case,' the United States
reviewed the utility and desirability of continued participation in the optional
jurisdictional regime established by Article 36(2) of the Statute of the In-
ternational Court of Justice.2 The Executive concluded essentially that the
experiment initiated by the regime neither had succeeded nor was likely to
succeed in the future; that its subscription was ragged and asymmetrical in
terms of world politics; that the Court, the custodian of this mode ofjuris-
diction, had adopted new theories of interpretation that were inconsistent,
in the U.S. view, with the thrust of the provision; that the Court itself had
changed; and that, in sum, continued United States participation would dis-
3- See Sztucki, Intervention under Article 63 of the IC/ Statute in the Phase ofPreliminary Proceedings:
The "Salvadoran Incident," 79 AJIL 1005 (1985); Chinkin, Third-Party Intervention before the
International Court ofJustice, 80 AJIL 495 (1986).
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. The author was one of the counsel for the
United States in the jurisdictional phase of the case, but did not participate in the case with
respect to the merits. The opinions expressed here are solely those of the author and do not
represent any official view of the United States Government or of the Department of State.
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S,), Jurisdiction
and Admissibility, 1984 ICJ REP. 392 (Judgment of Nov. 26). For the text of the U.S. Statement
on withdrawal from the case, see DEP'T ST. BULL., No. 2096, March 1985, at 64, reprinted in
24 ILM 246 (1985).
2 Declaration of Aug. 14, 1946, 61 Stat. 1218, TIAS No. 1598, 1 UNTS 9.
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criminate against United States interests while contributing nothing to world
order.' Accordingly, on October 7, 1985, the Secretary of State informed
the Secretary-General of the United Nations that the United States was
terminating, in accord with the terms of its Declaration and the provisions
of the Statute, its adherence to the optional regime under Article 36(2) of
the ICJ Statute.
4
The U.S. response addressed national policy with regard to the Court's
jurisdiction under Article 36(2). But the Judgment of November 26, 1984
had rested jurisdiction on both paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 36.' Nicaragua,
it will be recalled, had belatedly invoked Article XXIV of the 1956 Nica-
ragua-United States Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (the
FCN Treaty).6 Paragraph 2 of that provision provides: "Any dispute between
the Parties as to the interpretation or application of the present Treaty, not
satisfactorily adjusted by diplomacy, shall be submitted to the International
Court of Justice, unless the Parties agree to settlement by some other specific
means." 7 In the 1984 phase, the Court simply concluded that "there can be
no doubt that, in the circumstances in which Nicaragua brought its Appli-
cation to the Court, and on the basis of the facts there asserted, there is a
dispute between the Parties, inter alia, as to the 'interpretation or application'
of the [FCN] Treaty."8
Article XXI(1)(d) of the Treaty removes virtually all the key items in
Nicaragua's Application from the jurisdiction of the Court.9 It provides, in
relevant part, that "[t]he present Treaty shall not preclude the application
of measures: . . .(d) necessary to fulfill the obligations of a Party for the
maintenance or restoration of international peace and security, or necessary
to protect its essential security interests . . . ."" This provision was not
mentioned by the Court. Though Article XXIV(1) as well as customary
international law prescribes negotiation as a prerequisite to the unilateral
initiation of adjudication, the Court found that Nicaragua had discharged
that requirement in substance, if not in form.1"
In itsJudgment on the merits ofJune 27, 1986,12 the Court made certain
adjustments and retrofittings in its jurisdictional decision. It went through
the motions of qualifying a theretofore rather dismissive treatment of the
multilateral treaty reservation in the United States optional Declaration."3
See generally Dep't of State Press Statement, 24 ILM 1743 (1985).
4 See Contemporary Practice of the United States, 80 AJIL 163-65 (1986).
1984 ICJ REP. at 442, para. 113.
6 Id. at 426-27, para. 80. See also Separate Opinion of Judge Oda, id. at 472, 472.
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation,Jan. 21, 1956, Nicar.-U.S., 9 UST 449,
TIAS No. 4024, 367 UNTS 3 (entered into force May 25, 1958).
" 1984 ICJ REP. at 428, para. 83.
'See Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel, id. at 558, 635; see also Reisman, Has the Inter-
national Court Exceeded its Jurisdiction?, 80 AJIL 128, 130-31 (1986).
,0Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, supra note 7.
"1984 ICJ REP. at 428, para. 83.
'Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, 1986
ICJ REP. 14, 38, para. 56 (Judgment ofJune 27).
"3 1984 ICJ REP. at 425-26, paras. 75-76.
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But this was, in fact, a dimarche in appearance only, as the Court then pro-
ceeded to declare that the customary law and conventional law invoked in
the case were identical. 14 The Court confirmed its holding of jurisdiction
allegedly established under Article 36(1) of the Statute by the FCN Treaty.'
5
It brushed aside the manifest exclusions in Article XXI(1)(d) in a single brief
paragraph, in an argument consisting entirely of a superficial comparison
between the text in the Treaty and a comparable text in the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade.' 6 Moreover, it substantially expanded the ambit
of thejurisdictional clause of the Treaty by interpreting the Treaty broadly,
7
even reaching "implied" matters that also became subject to that clause.1
8
In effect, virtually anything "unfriendly," even were it otherwise within the
pale of lawful international action, was rendered unlawful because this was
a treaty of "friendship."' 9
It is not the purpose of this Note to criticize the reasoning or the quality
of judgment of the Court in this matter. The reader may find a range of
views and cogent analyses amid the dissenting opinions. 20 This Note examines
the implications of the Judgment with regard to the extensive United States
practice of using the Article 36(1) mode of jurisdiction and to ask whether
theJudgment ofJune 27, 1986 requires a reconsideration of U.S. attitudes.
I.
The Statute of the International Court ofJustice provides for both advisory
and contentious jurisdiction.2 In its advisory mode, the Court acts as a type
of international constitutional tribunal2 2 and as a cour de cassaticrn for inter-
national organizations that have been authorized to state questions to it.
23
In its contentious jurisdictional mode, the Court resolves issues between
states. These latter disputes may be referred to the Court in one of three
ways. One of these, the optional regime (Article 36(2)), is a type of aleatory
jurisdiction, in which states deposit general declarations with the Secretary-
General of the United Nations about the matters they are willing to adjudicate
with another state making a similar declaration. Thereafter, a declaring
state may initiate a case unilaterally against any other comparably declaring
state without securing its special consent to the adjudication and without
invoking an independent treaty clause. Article 36(2) jurisdiction is an in-
novative and experimental form, made possible by the continuity of the
14 1986 ICJ REP. at 92ff, para. 172 et seq. 1Id. at 115-16, para. 221.
1d. at 116, para. 222. 17Id. at 135ff, para. 271 etseq.
aId. at 138, para. 276.
'9 Cf id. at 136-37 and 138, paras. 273 and 275.
21See especially the Dissenting Opinions of Judges Oda and Schwebel, id. at 212 and 259,
respectively.
21 Art. 36, Statute of the International Court ofJustice, ICJ AcTS AND DOCUMENTS, No. 4
(1978).
22 See, e.g., Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter),
1962 ICJ REP. 151 (Advisory Opinion ofJuly 20).
2
1 See, e.g., Application for Review of'Judgement No. 273 of the United Nations Administrative
Tribunal, 1982 ICJ REP. 325 (Advisory Opinion ofJuly 20).
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International Court and its predecessor, the Permanent Court. But it has
rarely been used and, in the light of the United States withdrawal and sub-
sequent events, will probably decline further.
The more durable forms of the Court's jurisdiction are essentially a con-
tinuation of traditional arbitral forms. Article 36(1) provides: "The juris-
diction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all
matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in
treaties and conventions in force." Article 36(1) contemplates two modes
of engaging the contentious jurisdiction of the Court. One, by special agree-
ment ("all cases which the parties refer to it"), may be called "special agree-
mentjurisdiction." The other, comprising general agreements contemplating
disputes within or about particular treaty regimes ("all matters specially
provided for. . . in treaties and conventions in force"), may be referred
to as "treaty-based jurisdiction."
II.
The United States is a major consumer of treaty-based jurisdiction under
Article 36(1); according to the most recent ICJ Yearbook, Article 36(1)juris-
diction is incorporated in some 35 bilateral treaties to which the United
States is party.24 Moreover, the Senate is currently considering two more
treaties that will incorporate the Court's treaty-based jurisdiction. 25 The
United States also participates in a large number of multilateral treaties that
incorporate Article 36(1)jurisdiction.26 Even after the termination of Article
36(2) jurisdiction, the Department of State apparently continued to view
Article 36(1) treaty jurisdiction as a desirable and important form of dispute
resolution in treaties with commercial or other limited subject matter.
The doctrine of limited subject matter jurisdiction in these treaties is an
important feature of their attractiveness and is central to decisions to use
the International Court. The United States, like all other governments, views
adjudication as only one of a number of facultative options available to states
for the resolution of their disputes. In the absence of an affirmative choice
by a state, adjudication in international law is not mandatory.2 7 Some states
lawfully refuse to adjudicate anything. Others agree to selected matters. A
state is entitled to refuse to agree in advance to either a treaty-based or a
special agreement invitation to adjudicate matters that it thinks would be
better treated in other modes of dispute resolution. In much the same way
that many declarations made under Article 36(2) carefully and lawfully cir-
cumscribe the matters that the declaring state wishes to submit to the juris-
diction of the Court, clauses within treaties that establish jurisdiction under
24 1984-1985 ICJ Y.B. 102-18. For a list of the FCN treaties, see also List of Treaties of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 1980 ICJ Pleadings (United States Diplomatic and
Consular Staff in Tehran) 233-34 (Ann. 51 to U.S. Memorial).
" Trademark Registration Treaty, S. ExEc. Doc. H, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975); Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, S. ExEc. Doc. L, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
26 1984-85 ICJ Y.B., supra note 24.
217 But cf Corfu Channel Case, Preliminary Objection, 1948 ICJ REp. 15, 27 (Judgment of
Mar. 25).
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Article 36(1) are designed to operate only for those matters that the treaty
parties are explicitly agreeing to submit. This "presumption of confinement,"
so to speak, is basic to the use of the treaty-based mode.
The presumption of confinement was a central and explicit consideration
in U.S. decisions to use the International Court in the growing genre of
FCN treaties. To cite an example: a State Department memorandum dealing
with the dispute settlement provisions of a particular FCN treaty, which had
already been pleaded before the Court, expresses the presumption unequiv-
ocally:
The compromissory clause. . . is limited to questions of the inter-
pretation or application of this treaty; i.e., it is a special not a general
compromissory clause. It applies to a treaty on the negotiation of which
there is voluminous documentation indicating the intent of the parties.
This treaty deals with subjects which are common to a large number
of treaties, concluded over a long period of time by nearly all nations.
Much of the general subject-matter-and in some cases almost identical
language-has been adjudicated in the courts of this and other coun-
tries. The authorities for the interpretation of this treaty are, therefore,
to a considerable extent established and well known. Furthermore,
certain important subjects, notably immigration, traffic in military sup-
plies, and the "essential interests of the country in time of national
emergency", are specifically excepted from the purview of the treaty.
In view of the above, it is difficult to conceive how Article XXVIII (the
dispute resolution clause in the FCN treaty with China) [the treaty on
which the memorandum is based], could result in this Government's
being impleaded in a matter in which it might be embarrassed."8
Another State Department memorandum on provisions in commercial trea-
ties relating to the International Court addressed the same issue:
This paper. . . points out a number of the features which in its
view make the iprovision satisfactory. . . . These include the fact that
the provision is limited to differences arising immediately from the
specific treaty concerned, that such treaties deal with familiar subject-
matter and are thoroughly documented in the records of the negoti-
ation, that an established body of interpretation already exists for much
of the subject-matter of such treaties, and that such purely domestic
matters as immigration policy and military security are placed outside
the scope of such treaties by specific exceptions.
29
Both memoranda were pleaded to the Court in the U.S.-Iraniana case and
were reproduced in Judge Schwebel's dissent to the merits decision."o It is
quite clear from these memoranda, and, indeed, from the concerns of any
government contemplating adjudication, that the incorporation of Article
36(1)jurisdiction in American FCN treaties was premised on the assumption
21 Memorandum on Dispute Settlement Clause in Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation with China (n.d.), reproduced in 1980 ICJ Pleadings, supra note 24, at 234, 235
(Ann. 52 to U.S. Memorial).
2 Dep't of State, Memorandum on Provisions in Commercial Treaties relating to the Inter-
national Court of Justice (n.d.), reproduced in 1980 ICJ Pleadings, supra note 24, at 236, 237.
so 1986 ICJ REP. at 307-08, para. 101.
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that such jurisdiction would be confined to the explicit terms of the treaty.
Certain subject matter deemed to be of special domestic concern and, in
particular, matters of military security were not, in the U.S. view, any part
of the jurisdictional bargain. Indeed, had the Court in Nicaragua engaged
in an international legal interpretation of the FCN Treaty even faintly ap-
proximating what is prescribed in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, it would have found it impossible to ignore this manifest
expectation.
III.
The Judgment of June 27, 1986 has effectively shattered key elements
of the presumption of confinement. The Court reaffirms its earlier decision
of seisin under the FCN Treaty3' and then proceeds, as mentioned, to dispose
of the restrictive clause in the Treaty in a single paragraph and in a procedure
that hardly qualifies as a paragon of interpretation. 32 The Court concedes
that the effect of Article XXI of the FCN Treaty is to reserve certain matters
from the Court's jurisdiction, but holds that the determination of whether
a matter is excluded is not within the unilateral competence of the state
party. It is to be decided by the Court.33 In making that determination, the
Court may assume that the measures in question are related to the essential
security interests of the state concerned, but even then it will determine
"whether the risk run by these 'essential security interests' is reasonable,
and secondly, whether the measures presented as being designed to protect
these interests are not merely useful but 'necessary'.
34
One key element in the presumption of confinement is thus terminated.
While the United States may have thought that the insertion of words in
Article XXI of the Nicaragua-U.S. FCN Treaty and comparable -words in
the other treaties of this genre effectively excluded military matters, it now
learns that the prevailing theory of jurisdiction holds that these words are
no more than an initial claim by the United States that will be tested by the
Court in terms of its own view of their contextual necessity and reason-
ableness.
A second element of the presumption of confinement concerns explicit
subject matter. The memoranda of the United States considered above in-
dicate clearly that it was assumed that only matters that were explicitly within
the four corners of the treaty in question and not reserved were to be subject
to the jurisdictional clause. The Court, however, develops a theory of im-
plication: "there are certain activities of the United States which are such
as to undermine the whole spirit of a bilateral agreement directed to spon-
soring friendship between the two States parties to it." 5 The Court extends
this notion of implication in the following paragraph:
A State is not bound to continue particular trade relations longer than
it sees fit to do so, in the absence of a treaty commitment or other
' See note 15 supra and accompanying text. 3' See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
"See note 17 supra and accompanying text. 54 1986 ICJ REP. at 117, para. 224.
sId. at 138, para. 275.
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specific legal obligation; but where there exists such a commitment, of
the kind implied in a treaty of friendship and commerce, such an abrupt
act of termination of commercial intercourse as the general trade em-
bargo of I May 1985 will normally constitute a violation of the obli-
gation not to defeat the object and purpose of the treaty."
Thus, a second part of the presumption of confinement on which the juris-
dictional clauses of United States FCN treaties have rested has been shattered.
IV.
Students of international law are inclined to study the problem of the
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice from a developmental per-
spective. More jurisdiction is better; decisions that enhance juri.diction are
the most worthy of applause. The consumers of international adjudication,
governments and, more specifically, their international legal advisers, nec-
essarily look at jurisdiction from a different angle. Because adjudication in
international law is only one of a number of optional dispute resolution
mechanisms, legal advisers must consider its appropriateness for their gov-
ernment in terms of the nature of the dispute, the attitude of the potential
adversary with regard to adjudication, the alignments ofjudges on the Court,
the extent to which the countries from which they come have critical interests
in the potential dispute or parallel interests in cognate disputes, and so on.
Because adjudication has certain properties that, in different contexts, may
discriminate in favor of or against one of the parties, responsible legal advisers
must decide carefully which bilateral matters should be made subject to an
adjudicative jurisdictional clause and which should be reserved for other
dispute-resolving modalities. That thoroughly legitimate national policy de-
cision is meaningful only if the presumption of confinement operates and
is interpreted in good faith. Nicaragua has cast this essential condition
into doubt.
The question the United States must urgently address is whether, all
things considered, it can afford voluntarily to subject itself to this essentially
new regime. Variants of the "Portuguese Gambit""7 or "Hit and Run" that
have been examined in the context of Article 36(2) are possible in jurisdic-
tional clauses under Article 3 6(1). Changes of government and international
political alignment in the other treaty partners may make jurisdictional
clauses attractive political instruments for new governments to use against
the United States in matters only distantly related to the FCN treaty or to
the intentions of the parties; this has been rendered relatively easy, as the
Court is apparently willing to introduce a great deal under the hardly un-
common term of international political parlance, "friendship." In less ex-
treme cases, moderate governments may find it useful to develop ICJ cases
that exceed the U.S. understanding of the confined jurisdictional clause, for
Id., para. 276 (emphasis added). One may note that the Court is quite wrong here on the
law. See Dissenting Opinion ofJudge Oda, id. at 249-50, para. 80.
3
7 W. M. REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVIsION: THE REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT OF INTER-
NATIONAL JUDGMENTS AND AWARDS 379-83 (1971).
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bargaining purposes or to assuage an exigent domestic constituency to whom
the issue may be of concern.
That contingencies such as these are not the products of a feverish imag-
ination is confirmed by the case brought by Nicaragua. That the International
Court is willing to reach out and accept such cases under innovative con-
ceptions of its jurisdiction is now twice confirmed. In view of these devel-
opments, the United States would do well to undertake reconsideration of
its wide-ranging use of the Article 36(1) mode of jurisdiction, before there
are unpleasant surprises.
W. MICHAEL REISMAN*
LE PEUPLE, C'EST MOIl THE WORLD COURT
AND HUMAN RIGHTS
This essay examines the discussion of human rights and domestic juris-
diction by the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case.' Inde-
pendently of the final verdict about the lawfulness of U.S. help to the contras
under principles of either self-defense or humanitarian intervention, the
Court's views on the relationship among human rights, domestic jurisdiction
and intervention are wrong in law. Furthermore, the philosophical assump-
tions of the Judgment are profoundly disturbing. For the reasons set forth
below, I submit that the Court's approach embodies a backward view of
international law and justice that was totally unnecessary to the resolution
of the case.
The Court discussed the U.S. contention that the Government of Nica-
ragua had breached commitments to the Nicaraguan people, to the Orga-
nization of American States and to the United States with regard to Nicara-
guan domestic policies.2 These included "questions such as the composition
of the government, its political ideology and alignment, totalitarianism [and]
human rights." The Court then made the following general statement:
[These] questions . . .are questions of domestic policy. The Court
would not therefore normally consider it appropriate to engage in a
verification of the truth of assertions of this kind. . . .A State's do-
mestic policy falls within its exclusive jurisdiction, provided of course
that it does not violate any obligation of international law. Every State
possesses a fundamental right to choose and implement its own political,
economic and social systems. Consequently, there would normally be
* Professor of Law, Yale University; Board of Editors.
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, 1986
ICJ REP. 14 (Judgment ofJune 27). I do not address here the legality of the actions undertaken
by the United States, especially those involving the use of force for human rights purposes.
1986 ICJ REP. at 130-35, paras. 257-69. For Congress's formal findings that Nicaragua
had breached its human rights obligations, see H.R. REP. No. 237, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 63-
73 (1985), reproduced in pertinent part in id. at 90-92, paras. 169-70.
3 1986 ICJ REP. at 130, para. 257.
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